TL;DR
Kelp DAO claims LayerZero approved its 1-of-1 verifier setup, which led to a $292 million hack. LayerZero disputes this, stating the setup contradicted their security recommendations.
Kelp DAO claims that LayerZero personnel approved the 1-of-1 verifier setup, a decision LayerZero has since cited as the reason a North Korea-linked attacker drained roughly $292 million from Kelp's rsETH bridge.
The claim runs counter to LayerZero's April 19 postmortem, which said Kelp's rsETH application relied on LayerZero Labs as its sole verifier and that the setup "directly contradicts" LayerZero's recommended multi-DVN model.
Kelp's memo says LayerZero personnel reviewed its configurations for over 2.5 years and in eight integration discussions, without warning that a 1-of-1 setup posed a material security risk.
The memo, titled “Setting the Record Straight Around the LayerZero Bridge Hack,” includes screenshots of Telegram exchanges that document LayerZero’s awareness and lack of objection to Kelp’s verifier setup.
One screenshot shows a LayerZero team member saying: “No problem on using defaults either — just tagging [redacted] here since he mentioned you may have wanted to use a custom DVN setup for verifying messages, but will leave that to your team!” Kelp says the “defaults” referenced in the exchange were the 1-of-1 LayerZero Labs DVN configuration later cited by LayerZero as the application-level setup that enabled the exploit.
CoinDesk could not independently authenticate the screenshot.
LayerZero’s templates
Kelp also points to LayerZero's bug bounty scope, OFT Quickstart and developer examples as evidence that LayerZero treated verifier-network choices as application-level configuration while showing builders a one-DVN setup.
LayerZero's published bug bounty scope on Immunefi excludes from rewards "impacts to OApps themselves as a result of their own misconfiguration," including verifier networks and executors.
The LayerZero OFT Quickstart and the official OFT example configuration on GitHub show LayerZero Labs as the required DVN, with no optional DVN set.
Kelp's memo cites an April 19 post from Spearbit security researcher Sujith Somraaj, in which Somraaj said he had submitted a bug bounty report describing the same attack pattern and that LayerZero rejected it.